The electoral curse of poor, divided countries

Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – As time draws ever nearer for Burma’s 2010 general election, news of allegations of electoral irregularities consisting of various forms bribery, threats and outright vote manipulation are sure to increase. Needless to speculate, and largely warranted, fault will be laid at the doorstep of Than Shwe and company and round appeals made for the results of the election to be nullified and the reconvening of free and fair polls.

But are failing states saved via elections, even if polling adheres to relative international norms?

Electoral politics in poor, divided countries – and Burma is a poor, divided country – tend to realize the onset of even worse governing practices, with Paul Collier and his army of researchers finding that the twenty-four months leading up to an election prove highly improbable in ushering in any semblance of reform and the months to follow often foretelling of increased violence. The poor electoral practices being witnessed to date in Burma and likely to increase are, in short, exactly what can be expected of a poor, divided state lacking institutional strength.

It is quite plausible that an individual struggling to feed his family on barely a dollar day will weigh it in his best interest to take what he can from politicians in the run-up to the election. Heck, it could very well be the last time politicians do anything for him till the run-up to the next round of voting. There was evidence of this in Rangoon neighborhoods regarding the highly compromised 2008 constitutional referendum.

Even more disheartening, political parties that enter into the fray with the mindset of competing honestly and reaching out to the hearts of the electorate are almost sure to be disappointed, as the very platform is a losing proposition. There is a false belief in either the possibility of other parties playing fairly or being coerced into a fair game; when the truth is anything will be done to win given the life or death status of the polling. This logic is essentially that of the National League for Democracy’s in opting to boycott the balloting. However, as will be seen, the primary opposition’s decision could also abet a further decrease in the security of the state following elections.

And then there is the proverbial elephant in the corner: identity politics.

Whereas in mature democracies, the United States being an extreme example in this case, electoral politics goes some distance in insulating the system from targeting the tails of a an electoral bell curve, ethnic voting encourages candidates to focus on outlying ethnic blocs – perilously playing down the importance of policy.

In Burma, with the junta enjoying a vastly superior advantage in money and resource mobilization ahead of any polling, the opposition will naturally be pushed to further play up the identity card. The briefest of looks at the electoral registration list will show this is exactly what is transpiring. Further, the history of identity voting was also vividly on display during the ill-fated events of 1990.

Moreover, the trend of identity politics will only be magnified in the absence of the National League for Democracy from the campaign trail. The NLD could have chosen to compete in the elections invoking a political platform embracing such general (and national) hopes as opportunity, and thus embracing a wider cross-section of Burmese society.

Nonetheless, the heightened importance placed on identity politics in Burma is also emblematic of both past and present structural realities of the state.

From the country’s brief foray into multi-party democracy to the era dominated by Ne Win and his Burmese Socialist Programme Party, the country’s leadership has sought to steer a course socialist in orientation – exactly the opposite approach, economic research has found, that could have potentially bridged the fissures of a poor, divided country.

Interestingly, drawing on the research, the current hell-bent privatization drive of Burma’s generals is, in theory at least, an appropriate line to pursue given the structural realities and limitations of the state. However, the means of implementing the strategy are severely compromised.

Furthermore, in a bit of irony, the strong angle of identity/ethnic politics speaks to the relative absence of the state. Though most assuredly autocratic in form and function, the autocracy is not pervasive enough to quell the specter of ethnic politics – as was the case throughout much of the Soviet Union.

Is Burma in need of rescuing through general elections? No, quite simply because that is beyond the scope of elections, especially in an environment such as prevails in Burma. Yet, there is a need for elections. And for an environment conducive to elections to become reality, the structural underpinnings of the Burmese state need to be addressed accordingly.

Burma will not realize a per capita GDP of $10,000 in the near future, and people should by no means be expunged of their diverse identities – but new endeavors and progress toward economic revival and the constructing of a nation to fit the political state can be initiated, abetting in the advent of freer and fairer elections.

But it should be understood, freer and fairer is not the same as free and fair. This too harkens back to the nature of Burma as a poor, divided society. In such a situation, unrestrained, competitive elections too often serve to further put a hold on internal cooperation between competing elites. Owing largely to the importance placed on emerging victorious, the expected spoils are understood as one-sided and finite. And for Burma, there can be no doubt that what is not needed is grounds for further antagonism between competing elites.

This final realization furthers the recommended path forward. Not only are structural reforms necessary at the earliest possible date, they need to be agreed to by the country’s competing elites – so as to ensure electoral politics, free and fair or otherwise, does not unintentionally regress the potential for national advancement. Burma’s own electoral history provides ample evidence of the imbedded danger.

In the end it is not simply about elections. It is about cultivating the ground in both the lead-up to and aftermath of polling that determines whether or not elections can play a positive role. Today, with respect to the evolving shape of the 2010 polling, it is difficult to see how elections will further any peaceful, reform process of the Burmese state. However, the prospect of reform following from less than peaceful reactions to the changing socio-political space should not be entirely ruled out.