BURMA RELATED NEWS - JULY 28, 2012

U.N.: Crackdown on Muslims in Myanmar
Published: July 28, 2012 at 10:21 AM

UNITED NATIONS, July 28 (UPI) -- Security forces in Myanmar appear to have responded to clashes between Buddhists and Muslims by cracking down on Muslims, a U.N. official says.

Navi Pillay, the U.N. commissioner for human rights, called for an investigation of the violence in Rakhine state in the western part of Myanmar, the U.N. News Center said.

"We have been receiving a stream of reports from independent sources alleging discriminatory and arbitrary responses by security forces, and even their instigation of and involvement in clashes," Pillay said in a news release.

She said at least 78 people have been killed and thousands of homes have been destroyed in the state.

Andrej Mahecic, a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, said many Muslims have said they are afraid to go back home.

In Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and other top officials Friday condemned anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, Radio Free Europe reported. Two recent demonstrations, both sponsored by the government, have also been held in Iran to call on the international community to become involved.

RFE said the Iranian government has generally been silent about attacks on Muslims in countries it considers allies, including Russia and China.

Read more: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/07/28/UN-Crackdown-on-Muslims-in-Myanmar/UPI-54271343485300/#ixzz21w4uX1OQ
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The Nation - Myanmar court to rule on Thai drug, arms suspects Monday
Nantida Puangthong, Boonleun Promprathankul
The Nation July 28, 2012 1:00 am

A Myanmar court is expected to rule on the cases of 10 Thais charged with carrying war weapons and engaging in drug trafficking in Myanmar on MondayJuly 30, an informed source said yesterday.

"Myanmar military officials are now preparing the investigation report and gathering more evidence," the source said.

According to the source, if the Thais are convicted of possessing war weapons, they will face up to 20 years in jail. If they are found guilty of resisting officials, they may face life imprisonment.

These 10 Thai defendants are among 92 Thais who were already convicted of illegal entry and encroaching on forestland in Myanmar on July 23. That guilty verdict came with a jail term of three years and six months for each of them.

"The Myanmar court has not yet issued a ruling on the drugtrafficking and war weaponspossession cases," Foreign Minister Surapong Towichukchaikul said yesterday, "We are closely monitoring the cases."

The Thai Embassy in Myanmar has requested permission to visit the 92 detained Thais but has not yet received approval, he said.

"We will assist the Thai inmates with the appeal," Surapong said.

Weeratham Yimwan, a resident in Surat Thani's Khirirat Nikhom, said he hoped the government would be able to retrieve tractors, pickups, motorcycles, saws, and all gardening equipment of the detained Thais too. All these tools had been seized since the 92 Thais were arrested, Weeratham pointed out.

The commander of the 25th Infantry Regiment Task Force, Colonel Pornsak Pulsawat, speaking as head of the Township Border Committee in Ranong, said officials would first focus on trying to secure the release and return of the 92, before dealing with the return of the seized equipment.

Pornsak was now pinning his hopes on Myanmar President General Thein Sein's promise to look into these cases and provide assistance to the Thais. The Myanmar leader was quoted as giving the assurances to Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

It is believed that Thein Sein might consider granting pardons to the convicted Thais after the court issued the rulings.

"But there are many cases involved. The process may take time," Pornsak said.
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The Nation - TSL tests Myanmar auto service waters
Published: 28/07/2012 at 02:53 AM
Newspaper section: Business

TSL, the premium car import specialist, yesterday announced its expansion into Myanmar, its first international investment, starting with integrated automotive maintenance and body repair service.

Investing directly in Myanmar will prepare it for the Asean Economic Community in 2015, said Sureeporn Udompolvanich, the chief executive of TSL Auto Corporation, the independent importer of luxury car brands worldwide.

"Opening up of the regional free trade area is very positive for TSL in terms of labour, logistics, vehicles and parts," she said.

TSL will become the first automotive business from Thailand to enter the market in Myanmar.

Myanmar charges foreign-owned companies no corporate income tax for five years, extendable every three years to attract foreign investment.

Myanmar also has more abundant resources than Thailand, which could be used in the production of auto parts, she added.

"We expect development and investment will flock to Myanmar in the near future. As a neighbour, we hope to have an edge over other countries in understanding Myanmar consumers due to our close cultures," said Ms Sureeporn.

TSL will introduce a car maintenance and body repair service as its starting business in Myanmar by year-end.

SMRT, a well-known maintenance service in Thailand among premium car importers, will be brand-registered in Myanmar to handle car maintenance and body repair service.

The investment cost for SMRT is about US$1 million, with TSL investing 40% and local partners 60%.

Other services will include car window film, tyres, spare parts, lubricating oil and car decoration items.

The SMRT workshop will be built on 1.5 rai of land in central Yangon, with six hoists to serve 30 vehicles per day. Four trained mechanics and technicians from Thailand will be stationed there.

SMRT will service all brands of used European cars, but Toyota will be the only Japanese brand.

The company will make deals with car importers in Myanmar to provide maintenance to their customers.

Today no professional workshops operate in Myanmar, with small roadside garages the norm.

Ms Sureeporn said SMRT hopes to break even in Myanmar in two years on the back of monthly revenue of 3 million baht.

"The automotive import market in Myanmar is rather vast, and premium car users are also numerous, as the mechanics tend to have poor skills, so this is a business opportunity for TSL," she added.
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26 including Thais and Myanmar detained in anti-drug operation
2012-07-28 13:08

KUALA LUMPUR, July 28 (Bernama) -- Twenty-six individuals including Thai and Myanmar nationals, as well as a woman, were detained following an operation code-named 'Op Tapis Khas' at the Selayang Wholesale Market, early this morning.

Sentul District Police Narcotics CID chief, DSP Mohamed Fadzil Rahman said, those arrested in the operation, which started at 6am, were believed to be drug pushers and addicts, aged 28 to 40.

"This a schedular operation and the wholesale market is a hotspot for drug abuse. An inspection on 49 people found that most of them were using syabu and heroin," he told reporters after the operation, here, today.

He said some of them obtained their drug supply from outside the Klang Valley, some from the northern states, before distributing them on a small scale at the wholesale market, which was the focus of the public.

The operation this time ended at 11am and was carried out by 30 policemen and four officers, including personnel from the Jinjang Police Station.

Meanwhile, Mohamed Fadzil said drug related seizures until July saw an increase when 731 people were detained from around the wholesale market compared with 569 last year.

This indicated an increase of 22.1 per cent in the number of arrests, he said.
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VOA News - US Ambassador to Burma Sees Growing Ties Between Countries
July 27, 2012

The U.S. ambassador to Burma says there is "excellent momentum" in the relationship between the United States and Burma, but acknowledged there are enormous challenges ahead.

Derek Mitchell told VOA that his new appointment demonstrates Washington's commitment to building the relationship. Mitchell arrived in Burma earlier this month as the first U.S. ambassador to that country in 22 years.

"My appointment, whether it is me or anyone else - the fact that there is an ambassador for the first time in 22 years - I think speaks to the commitment now of this administration, of the United States generally, even our Congress, to take the relationship to another level,” said Mitchell.

The United States has been re-engaging Burma after a new, nominally civilian government took over in March of last year and began implementing reforms. Mitchell said his office would be responding to positive changes in Burma.

"Clearly, we have said from the start - really a year ago, we can even start in 2009 - that we are going to be responding to changes that occur on the ground,” he said. “That we will be responding for action with action. And we have seen continuing action, continuing momentum towards reform. And I think we are trying to keep up with that."

Mitchell acknowledged that Burma faces many challenges to becoming a democratic country.

"It is premature to say that all is well or that this process is inevitably going to lead towards a positive or stable solution. As you lay out, there are enormous challenges that lay ahead,” said Mitchell. “Nobody has any illusions about the challenges to come, or the challenges of keeping unity or democracy in line. The key is to keep moving in the right direction. And move step by step."

Mitchell said he has many goals in his new role, including traveling the country to begin to build a better relationship.

"I want to get around the country, meet all different types of people from every different section of Burma. I think that is very important to build that understanding because we have been separated for so long," he said.

Mitchell said he also will work to encourage an open and free media in Burma, and help to facilitate more military contacts between the United States and Burma.

Earlier this month, the Obama administration announced it is easing restrictions on U.S. companies interested in doing business in Burma. A White House statement said easing such sanctions will provide immediate incentives for reformers and benefit the Burmese people.
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The Nation - TSL tests Myanmar auto service waters
Published: 28/07/2012 at 02:53 AM
Newspaper section: Business

TSL, the premium car import specialist, yesterday announced its expansion into Myanmar, its first international investment, starting with integrated automotive maintenance and body repair service.

Investing directly in Myanmar will prepare it for the Asean Economic Community in 2015, said Sureeporn Udompolvanich, the chief executive of TSL Auto Corporation, the independent importer of luxury car brands worldwide.

"Opening up of the regional free trade area is very positive for TSL in terms of labour, logistics, vehicles and parts," she said.

TSL will become the first automotive business from Thailand to enter the market in Myanmar.

Myanmar charges foreign-owned companies no corporate income tax for five years, extendable every three years to attract foreign investment.

Myanmar also has more abundant resources than Thailand, which could be used in the production of auto parts, she added.

"We expect development and investment will flock to Myanmar in the near future. As a neighbour, we hope to have an edge over other countries in understanding Myanmar consumers due to our close cultures," said Ms Sureeporn.

TSL will introduce a car maintenance and body repair service as its starting business in Myanmar by year-end.

SMRT, a well-known maintenance service in Thailand among premium car importers, will be brand-registered in Myanmar to handle car maintenance and body repair service.

The investment cost for SMRT is about US$1 million, with TSL investing 40% and local partners 60%.

Other services will include car window film, tyres, spare parts, lubricating oil and car decoration items.

The SMRT workshop will be built on 1.5 rai of land in central Yangon, with six hoists to serve 30 vehicles per day. Four trained mechanics and technicians from Thailand will be stationed there.

SMRT will service all brands of used European cars, but Toyota will be the only Japanese brand.

The company will make deals with car importers in Myanmar to provide maintenance to their customers.

Today no professional workshops operate in Myanmar, with small roadside garages the norm.

Ms Sureeporn said SMRT hopes to break even in Myanmar in two years on the back of monthly revenue of 3 million baht.

"The automotive import market in Myanmar is rather vast, and premium car users are also numerous, as the mechanics tend to have poor skills, so this is a business opportunity for TSL," she added.
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Washington Post - Opinions:Turning Burma’s small steps into bigger ones
By Karel Schwarzenberg, Published: July 27

Karel Schwarzenberg is deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Czech Republic. He was president of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights from 1984 to 1991 and was chief of staff to Václav Havel from 1990 to 1992.

Václav Havel’s understanding of the trials of a democratic transition provided a lesson for the Czech Republic — and highlights a fundamental truth for Burma’s path forward.

Writing on this page seven years ago, the former Czech president expressed his ardent desire for reform in Burma that would make it possible for him to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who was under house arrest. “I wish for her that those changes will happen as soon as possible, and that my silly idea — to hand her a rose — becomes a simple and easy thing to do,” he wrote. His health did not allow him to travel to Burma after she was released, but they did speak by phone in December 2010. Aung San Suu Kyi warmly thanked Havel for his long-standing activism on behalf of democracy and human rights in Burma. After Havel died last December, his friends collected roses from his coffin and gave them to artists who had volunteered to produce a work preserving the flowers, making it possible to fulfill Havel’s wish posthumously.

Personal Post

In recent months, substantial changes have been made in Burma. During my trip to Naypyidaw this month, President Thein Sein and other leaders explained the government’s plans. I was surprised by how open and frank they were and how interested they were in the Czech transition process. The Burmese government has concluded cease-fire agreements with most of the country’s ethnic nationalities and has taken steps to end the 60-year war with the Karen people. The fighting with the Kachin, however, continues, and violence has erupted in Rakhine state. There are many violations of the cease-fires, and there are still hundreds of prisoners of conscience in Burmese prisons.

It’s important to realize that while the president and his cabinet are willing to start a peace process, it is difficult to change a decades-old military mind-set.

I remember when I returned to my homeland after 40 years of exile and traveled throughout the Czech country. I was appalled by the dilapidated buildings and devastated towns. Even the forests had been destroyed by acid rain. Havel, then our president, asked for a report from my trip. Upon listening to my findings, he told me: “You have been away for a long time. The buildings will be restored when their owners get them back. The forests will rejuvenate again when we get the cleaning filters for the power plants installed. The towns will rebound soon. But it will take a very long time to repair the damage to the souls of our people.”

Similarly, it will take time before the idea of freedom, the rule of law and democracy trickle down to the last commander in the most remote district of Burma. In this process, we can offer material help, but it is perhaps more important that we share the experience from our own peaceful transition to democracy, the rule of law and the market economy.

While in Burma, I met with the leaders of ethnic minorities and civil society representatives. I also met with the National League for Democracy party and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. I was able to fulfill Havel’s wish by presenting the glass-encased rose. I wanted to honor the relationship between the two great champions of democracy, but doing so was also a symbol of the Czech Republic’s commitment to accompanying Burma on its path to democracy and peace.

During our meeting, Aung San Suu Kyi encouraged our delegation to continue the programs our country has arranged in Burma — translations of selected books by Havel and a handbook on the politics of transition, as well as training programs for media and community leaders.

“It is fascinating for us to read about the experiences of others who have struggled against authoritarian regimes,” she wrote in her essay “Czechs and us” in 1998. “I think perhaps some of them will be dissidents for life, their intellectual combativeness ever ready to question the ways of authority, whosoever that may be.”

Our experience makes us keenly aware of the treacherous path that Burmese democrats have to negotiate. The task requires weighing risks and opportunities, patience and compromise. There will be courageous decisions that they — and only they — can responsibly make. The outside world should be careful in mentoring Burma’s leadership. The international community must resist pressing for radical steps, which could set the whole process back years, or decades, nor be willing to accept cosmetic changes.

Burma needs genuine national reconciliation. It also urgently needs investment oriented not toward plundering the country’s natural riches but that creates possibilities for its young generation and respects the rights of farmers and ethnic minorities. No democracy can survive without offering opportunities and jobs that enable an acceptable standard of living. Together with the Burmese people, we can express our unequivocal belief that, in Aung San Suu Kyi’s words, “To talk about change is not enough. Change must happen.”
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Xinhua News - Chinese official visits Myanmar over Mekong murder case
13:20, July 28, 2012

BEIJING, July 27 (Xinhua) -- Liu Yuejin, director of the Narcotics Control Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, on Friday met and exchanged ideas with Myanmar officials over the murder of 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong River last year.

Liu, also head of the special investigation team for the case, met with Myanmar's Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and a senior official with Myanmar's Defense Services in Nay Pyi Taw, the country's capital, according to a statement released Friday by China's Ministry of Public Security.

"The two sides exchanged information and opinions regarding the case and reached positive results concerning further measures," said the statement.

Naw Kham, head of an armed drug gang and believed to be associated with the bandits who killed the Chinese sailors, was arrested on April 25 at an undisclosed location in Laos.

The drug lord was extradited to China for an investigation and court trial on May 10.

Chinese police said a joint police investigation in China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand found evidence that Naw Kham, core members of the gang and a small number of Thai soldiers planned and conducted the murders of 13 Chinese sailors on two cargo ships on Oct. 5 last year.

Liu's visit followed Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu's trip to Myanmar, during which Meng urged the two countries to carry out strengthened law enforcement cooperation as well as a joint crackdown on Naw Kham's gang.

During the meeting, the two sides shared the evidence held by each and discussed army-police cooperation in their next move, said the statement.

The gang, consisting of more more than 100 members and armed with assault rifles, bazookas and machine guns, is believed to have engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping, murder, looting and other crimes along the Mekong for many years.
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The Irrawaddy - Why Burma’s Opposition Is Playing with Fire
By MIN ZIN| July 28, 2012 |

Burmese government ministers and their proxies are building up their frequent flyer miles. They’ve been making trips to their Southeast Asian neighbors as well as Western countries ranging from Norway to the U.S., the newest enthusiasts of Burma’s reform. The cynics might characterize these trips as part of a charm offensive, but in fact they’re much more substantive than a PR ploy. These are not the usual attempts to solicit aid from the West; they are, in fact, part of a campaign “to bring the exiles back home.”

Major Zaw Htay, the director of the Presidential Office, recently made a visit to the U.S., where he met with a cozy reception from the State Department and some Burmese groups. Hla Maung Shwe, a leading businessman-cum-advisor to the regime, is due in August. In fact, Burma’s general-turned-civilian president, Thein Sein, has apparently assigned his trusted aides to lead these delegations to court the West and the community of political exiles.

Traditionally the regime has used various combinations of three strategies against dissenters: coercion, containment, and co-optation. Now, for the first time, the Burmese state is relying primarily on co-optation to stabilize and legitimize its regime-led transition. One of the most repressive states in the world is now working hard to embrace and absorb the opposition, both at home and abroad. (In the image above, opposition leaders take the parliamentary oath.)

Thein Sein explicitly announced this agenda in his inauguration speech of March 31, 2011. He urged all parties to “work together in the national interest” rather than engaging in oppositional politics against the government. Parliamentary leaders discourage the non-ruling members of parliament from using the word “opposition” in parliamentary debates.

Aung San Suu Kyi, who entered parliament after a sweeping victory in the by-elections earlier this year, has so far responded to the regime’s overtures. She emphasized that she joined the parliament — which is dominated by the military-backed party — in order to cooperate with all the forces represented there, not to oppose the government. Suu Kyi has proved her credentials as a member of the “loyal opposition” by accepting an assignment from the parliament to help in lifting Western sanctions against Burma. (For instance, she called U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell and asked him to remove the remaining trade sanctions.)

I have no quarrel with any of this. I have long argued that the opposition should allow themselves to be co-opted into the existing political game as an inevitable part of a dual-track strategy that places equal emphasis on participation and contestation. In this fragile phase of the transition — one in which the balance of power is skewed toward the ruling elites — the opposition must work with the incumbents to undertake much-needed institution-building.

However, the recent violent ethnic riots in Arakan state between ethnic Arakan Buddhists and stateless Rohingya Muslims has opened an unexpected and larger opportunity for the regime to put its co-optation strategy into practice by exploiting nationalist passions. Both sides in this communal conflict are underdogs: The Arakan people, who are repressed and exploited by the Burmese-dominated military regime, and the Rohingyas, who reside at the very bottom of the country’s discriminatory pecking order. By killing each other, the two groups themselves become the ultimate losers. But the regime — which has allegedly committed human rights violations against the Rohingyas after having declared a state of emergency in the region — has successfully managed to stir up a siege mentality within the Burmese people at home and abroad.

In early July, President Thein Sein told UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres that the country will not allow the illegal immigrant Rohingyas to live in the country, and that the only solution to the problem is to hand the Rohingyas over to the UNHCR, which must put them in refugee camps, providing food and shelter. Otherwise, they will be sent to a third accepting county.

Burmese racists are rallying behind Thein Sein’s massive resettlement policy. State flags are flying in Arakan state hailing the president’s position. There are also plenty of unashamedly racist comments circulating in social media outlets. But it is above all the local media and some leading activists and monks — the same ones who spent years in the military’s gulags for championing democracy and human rights — who are cheerleading the regime’s approach. Even Aung San Suu Kyi, a symbol of morality in the world at large, is silent on the racist nature of this discrimination and violence, instead treating it as an issue of the rule of law.

The once much-despised army is now being regarded as the indispensable defender and savior of “national security.” Ironically, many exiled “freedom fighters” — who sought refugee status in democracies like Japan or England after crying out against the military’s violations of human rights — are now staging demonstrations in support of Thein Sein’s plan to expel 800,000 Rohingyas from the country. They use the phrase “national interest” without explaining what they mean by it. They style themselves as defenders of “national sovereignty,” without understanding that in the modern world, the matter of external sovereignty (such as territorial integrity) is protected by international law. (And, in so doing, they tend to overlook that the critical issue in Burma right now is actually the democratization of internal sovereignty — reforming, in other words, the relationship between the state and the people by giving greater power to the latter.)

The Arakan violence shows that the mainstream opposition, along with a considerable segment of the population, have failed to appreciate the universality of human rights and dignity. Contrary to Buddha’s teaching, they fail to practice compassion for all victims of violence. (And it’s worth noting that, in any case of communal violence, it is always hard to claim that one side is purely innocent and the other the absolute villain.)

All this makes them highly susceptible to the regime’s demagoguery. Such situations can lead to different outcomes. In certain cases, where pro-democracy activists have managed to maintain their focus on liberal values, being co-opted by the ruling regime has ultimately led to an open society. (I’m thinking here particularly of Chile in the 1980s.) But there are other cases where opposition forces have succumbed to state nationalism, which then becomes a recipe for fascism and bloodshed. (Just take the Balkans in the 1990s.) Burma’s presumed pro-democracy activists would be well-advised to keep these two possible paths in mind.

Min Zin is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley. This commentary originally appeared on the Foreign Policy blog “Transitions.” The views expressed here are those of the author.
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The Irrawaddy - INTERVIEW: Reflections on Kachin History
By CARLOS SARDIÑA GALACHE| July 28, 2012 |

LAIZA—Baptist Rev. Ja Gun is one of the most prominent historians and linguists in Kachin State. Educated at the University of Rangoon during the 1960-70s, a period of great student activism in which he took part, he now tutors Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) soldiers about local political history and endeavors to change “their worldview, which in the past has been limited by the Burmese curriculum.” Speaking to The Irrawaddy in late June, Ja Gun discussed the historical roots of the present conflict between the KIO and Burmese government as well as the main stumbling blocks towards attaining peace and reconciliation from a Kachin perspective.

Question: Can start with the pre-colonial era. What was the relationship like back then between the Kachin people and Burmese Kingdom in Mandalay?

Answer: The Kachin people were living between the Burmese Kingdom and the Chinese Kingdom—we were sandwiched between these two powers. Whenever the Burmese kings wanted to cross to China, they had to consult with the Kachin chiefs first. We are living in this buffer zone and, since time immemorial, the Kachin people controlled this borderland.

We had an off-and-on relationship with the Burmese kings. Sometimes the strong rulers came to our land and then conquered Mougong and Bhamo, just the lowlands. In former times, the Kachin people were mercenaries. Kachin people had the advantage that they could adapt to this weather, this situation and this mountain region. The Burmese soldiers had good weapons, but it was very difficult for them to overcome the natural hindrances. Whenever there was a war those who made an alliance with the Kachin won.

Q: There seems to be a sense superiority among the Burmese majority towards the ethnic minorities, like the Kachin or the Karen, who they call hill tribes. What do you think are the origins of this?

A: The Burmese were very much proud of the fact that they had kings and the Kachins were very aggressive and the fact was that we never have been subjected to any people, neither Chinese nor Burmese. The British were the first who conquered the Kachin people. The Kachin were always fighting, sometimes fighting within and sometimes fighting their enemies.

The Shans civilized first and the Kachin people tried to adopt the Shan civilization and our terminology is loaned from the Shan, and we learned the farming of the wet lands from the Shan people. The Burmese kings had no intention to control the Kachin because they regarded the Kachins as wild people. So they totally ignored us.

Q: Let’s move to the colonial times. How did the British change Burma and the Kachin?

A: British Burma and the Burmese Kingdom were quite different things. The kingdom of the Burmese kings was very limited—they could not rule the whole of Kachin State, Wa State, Karenni State and the others—they just ruled central Burma. So the British conquered all these places because they wanted to make a fence for the Indian sub-continent.

During the resistance to British advances in 1886 we didn’t find any Burmese commanders resisting, but all the Kachin rulers resisted the occupation at that time. The Burmese throne, in the hands of King Thibaw, had been withdrawn in 1885, so the British thought that they had automatically won Kachin State. But as soon as they arrived the Kachin chiefs resisted the British and finally the British learnt that we, the Kachins, were not the property of the Burmese king.

So our feeling today is that joining the Union is a voluntary association. Shan, Kachin and other ethnic minorities had their own history, their own home, their land, their own native language before colonial rule. And then, at the time of the British government, the British organized all those ethnic minorities in our land and made British Burma.

Q: During World War II, the Kachins fought alongside the British while the Burmese spent most of the conflict alongside the Japanese under the leadership of Gen Aung San. How did this affect relations between the Kachin and Burmese?

A: The Kachin and the Chin peoples were sympathizers of the Allied Forces, so Aung San and his Burmese Independence Army (BIA) came up during Japanese rule and killed many Kachin people because they accused them of being the stooges of foreign imperialism. I have many records of this. They used Japanese guns everywhere. Until 1944, the BIA came to villages and made trouble for the Kachin people.

It’s a funny thing to say that the BIA liberated Burma from Japanese occupation. The Allied Forces and the Kachin, the northern Kachin rangers, expelled all the Japanese in conjunction with some hill peoples. The Burmese and Shan sided with the Japanese. The Kachin rangers celebrated Panam Manaw festivities after the victory in Bhamo on March 24-26, 1945, and Aung San started the anti-Japanese movement in Rangoon the day after on March 27. So they were only involved for two or three months.

Because of the victory against Japanese occupation, the Kachin people were the main race to talk about political matters because we had the upper hand in our land—that is, in the transitional period. There were no Burmese troops there at that time, only Kachin troops. At the Victory Manaw, the Kachin leaders invited Aung San and his anti-fascist people. They came up and met with us and then we agreed to join for independence.

Q: In 1947, the Kachins signed the Panglong Agreement with other groups. Did the civilian government of U Nu respect the agreement?

A: After the death of Aung San, U Nu maintained the Panglong spirit, but the greatest loss of all for us was the U Nu-Attlee Agreement. With the Panglong Agreement we attained equality, but the ethnic minorities had no wisdom at that time. The U Nu-Attlee Agreement was very important because it transferred all the power to U Nu’s AFPFL [Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League] including defense and financial matters.

With the 1948 Constitution, the big parties like the AFPFL controlled the whole Parliament and with the U Nu-Attlee Agreement the Rangoon government received all properties and power from the British government.

Q: The KIO was created in 1961. What happened at that moment and why was it created then?

A: At that time, representation of ethnic minorities in the constituent assembly was very limited. With the 1948 Constitution, the Burmese government manipulated the ethnic minorities by controlling representatives in Parliament. The first disadvantages came when we transferred some Kachin villages to China.

Kachin people, especially Kachin students, opposed that transfer but due to the Constitution we had no voice because our representation was very limited. And the second problem was the state religion. In our Constitution we wanted separation between church and state but U Nu used Buddhism for his political manipulations. We did not hate the Buddhists, we hated his manipulation of Buddhism in political affairs.

Our promise in the Panglong Agreement was fairness and fundamental rights— protection of minorities, equality, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and fundamental democracy. That’s what we included in the Panglong Agreement. But with the 1948 Constitution U Nu tried to manipulate the law and then, due to these two facts—the state religion and the transfer of power—there would be no hope in Parliament for the Kachin people.

So we started our armed struggle on Feb. 5, 1961. Until now, we want to talk about political matters first. No ceasefire agreement, no development programs—we don’t need these programs. We have to start talking about political matters as our problems have been rooted in political issues since the Panglong Agreement.

Q: At the beginning of the KIO’s existence, the Kachin wanted independence but then, in the 1970s, they changed and started to demand autonomy. Why did they change their stance from independence to autonomy?

A: We realized we would not attain our fundamental goal, so we would talk conditionally about internal self-determination. Our independence, deep in our hearts, is non-negotiable but because of our conditions—we are landlocked—and also due to our neighboring countries, our military strength and our leadership, we need to adapt to survive.

At that time, socialist governments tended to get together. The same happened in the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia, and also in the Western bloc. People everywhere were getting together so we tried to switch and make alliances with other groups—the Karen, the Chin, the Rakhine. So we wanted to ally with them and promote their political position as well. And our ultimate goal will probably be full independence.

Q: Do you think that a compromise between the Burmese and Kachin is more likely with Thein Sein in power than with former junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe? With this so-called transition to democracy?

A: We expect in the near future that there will be internal strife within Thein Sein’s government. Maybe Thein Sein one day will understand the problem of the ethnic minorities. Suu Kyi understands our situation and Thein Sein maybe understands it but it is a very difficult situation because of the very different political cultures.

We are democratic but they want to establish a Burman hegemony—Burman dominant rule, that’s their political culture. People who live outside Myanmar understand this, that unless they change their political culture it is very difficult to reconcile with each other.

If the Burmans change their political culture, we will reconcile. Suu Kyi’s position is good to reconcile one day. We do not want to dominate the Burmans, we want to defend our land that is associated with our history, our identity and even our religion in the older times.

Q: What do you think is the main obstacle to attaining reconciliation with the Burmans?

A: The main stumbling block is the military, the military regime. The military regime is the replacement of the Burmese kings. Their attitude is to replace the Burmese kings, and the Burmese kings regarded us as wild men—they didn’t consider us as a people.
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The Irrawaddy - FEATURE: Review—The Lady and the Peacock
By HNIN WATHAN| July 27, 2012 |

Burma has been in the limelight for the past few months. A number of reforms have been carried out by the quasi-civilian government led by reformist President Thein Sein, including the release of political prisoners and Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy being entering Parliament.

The response from the international community has also been rather optimistic with the easing of economic sanctions by the United States and European Union. Many foreign companies including General Electric and Coca Cola have made moves to invest in Burma.

And, of course, when people talk about Burma, it is impossible to leave out Suu Kyi, who spent much of the last two decades under house arrest.

In Burma, people throng to listen to her speeches and to catch a glimpse of her visits. The Nobel Laureate’s picture is now regular features in Burma’s media—as if it guarantees increased sales—and also widely posted in social networks such as Facebook.

Wherever Suu Kyi travels, she is embraced with warmth, love and admiration—not only by Burmese people but also the international community. More than ever, she has become a global icon after being able to travel outside Burma for the first time to attend forums and officially accept her Nobel Peace Prize in Norway.

A number of books have been written about the 67-year-old and her role in Burma’s political struggle. The Lady and the Peacock by Peter Popham—the latest biography on Suu Kyi—takes on a more personal outlook of her life.

Popham includes journal entries of Ma Theingi who was Suu Kyi’s personal assistant and companion during her arduous election campaign tour of 1989 and with whom she later fell out. Those journal entries were recorded at the request of Michael Aris, Suu Kyi’s husband, and were made available to the author through an anonymous friend.

By dividing the book into five parts—Suu Kyi’s father Gen Aung San; her years growing up in India; her life in England; her involvement in Burmese politics from 1988 to 2002; and after 2002—Popham attempts to analyze Suu Kyi’s life and how her family background and the historical events in Burma have shaped who she is today.

He does a fine job of depicting the different stages of Suu Kyi’s life: from her formative years, to a student, then a housewife and finally an inspirational political leader for the Burmese people.

Many of Suu Kyi’s attributes are also excellently portrayed in the book: her sense of duty for being “her father’s daughter;” her strong morality regarding Burmese traditions and culture despite growing up in foreign countries; and her sense of discipline with her children.

Popham also describes her resolute determination and courage when sticking to her goals despite being subjected to physical and mental hardships—the house arrest for most of her years in Burma; the denial of a visa to her dying husband; the brutal attack on her life in Depayin in 2003 when many of her supporters were killed trying to protect her.

Through interviews and comments made by Suu Kyi’s close friends in Oxford, rare snippets about her are included. Like many others in life, she studied a course in which she was not interested at the insistence of her strict mother and ended up with an underwhelming third class degree albeit at prestigious Oxford University. Popham is such an accomplished storyteller that most people will be caught up in his description and narration about events in Suu Kyi’s life.

A list of references on articles and books, written about Burma and Suu Kyi, at the end of the biography indicates the level of extensive research Popham carried out. Yet, whenever he tries to provide an analysis of events in Burma, as a Burmese person myself, I do not feel that he possesses enough in-depth understanding about the myriad underlying issues in the country—the history of ethnic conflicts, national reconciliation and the reform process, to name but a few.

In contrast, Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist who has written seven books on Burma and has reported on Burmese issues for over two decades, is able to give a concise and yet thought-provoking analysis in his offering Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s struggle for democracy.

Two critical points cast a black cloud over the credibility of Popham’s book.

First is a statement, included without any source, that now-retired Snr-Gen Than Shwe “admitted [to] ordering the massacre, with the aim of ‘eradicating’ Aung San Suu Kyi.” Never has such admission been recorded and it is unimaginable for Than Shwe to so brazenly make such a claim.

Second is Popham’s accusation that Ma Theingi was responsible for his repatriation from Burma during a visit. It seems that his close association with Michael Aris, who regarded Ma Theingi as being disloyal, clouded his view of her.

Without any credible proof, he agrees with accusations of Ma Theingi having “gone over” to the junta’s side after she became vocally critical about Suu Kyi and her party’s policies.

I also wonder about Popham’s intention to include an assumption by Suu Kyi’s friends about how she fell in love with a Pakistani student, who later worked in the Pakistani Foreign Service and who declined to be interviewed for the book, during her second year at Oxford. Was this just an attempt to sensationalize Suu Kyi’s love-life during her younger days?

He also seems as star-struck when he likens Suu Kyi, giving her first political speech to an audience while in her mid-40s, to a 17-year-old girl. Without a doubt, all of us will agree how youthful Suu Kyi appears even now. However, just from seeing Suu Kyi’s picture from that time, it is clear that comparing her to teenager is a gross exaggeration.

At times, the book tends towards being unnecessarily longwinded with exhaustive details about political events in Burma. Popham could have just included the concise versions of those events which are significant for Burma’s history and Suu Kyi, but then he would not have been able to fill up all those 398 pages.

For those who have read other books written about Burma or Aung San Suu Kyi, the only new or interesting material is the entries from Ma Theingi’s journal. Although the quotes provide readers with a rare glimpse of the intimate details into Suu Kyi’s life, it would have been better not to include quote-after-quote, containing a repetitive and sometimes trivial details like what Suu Kyi wore and what she ate, continuously page-after-page.

Popham states that his story on Suu Kyi is not “just the story of a courageous woman who challenged a military junta and lost”—an assertion that Suu Kyi herself never made—but of someone who has a more “complex and interesting” side.

No doubt that Ma Theingi’s journal entries and the chapter on Suu Kyi’s childhood years are interesting, enhanced by the good storytelling skills of Popham, and contain details other prior biographers have left out. Other than that, Popham might have been too presumptuous about his aims for his book and his understanding on his subjects—Suu Kyi and Burma.